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Do Tuition Fees Affect the Mobility of University Applicants? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment
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Several German states recently introduced tuition fees for university education. We 
investigate whether these tuition fees influence the mobility of university applicants. Based on 
administrative data of applicants for medical schools in Germany, we estimate the effect of 
tuition fees on the probability of applying for a university in the home state. We find a small 
but significant reaction: The probability of applying for a university in the home state falls by 2 
percentage points (baseline: 69%) for high-school graduates who come from a state with 
tuition fees. Moreover, we find that students with lower high-school grades react more 
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earlier draft. 1 Introduction
Education at public universities has been free of charge for the past 30 years in Ger-
many. Recently, however, several German states re-introduced tuition fees amount-
ing to 1,000 euro per year. In this paper we want to analyze whether the introduction
of tuition fees aﬀected the mobility of university applicants. In particular, we are
interested in the question whether applicants from states that introduced tuition
fees have a lower probability of applying at a university in their home state.
This question is interesting from a political and from a theoretical point of view.
All German high-school alumni are allowed to apply for universities all over Ger-
many. If the introduction of tuition fees by selected states aﬀect the mobility of
university applicants in such a way that universities in tuition fee states are avoided,
applicants from states that did not introduce fees might have a lower probability to
be admitted to a university in their home state. Furthermore, if tuition fees aﬀect
groups of university applicants in diﬀerent ways, the policy might also inﬂuence the
composition of students across states.
In the theoretical literature on education policy and ﬁscal federalism many mod-
els rely on assumptions concerning the mobility of high-school graduates, or more
generally, the mobility of university applicants. For example, one typical question
in this context addresses the issue whether centralized or de-centralized ﬁnancing
of universities is optimal (e.g., Schwager, 2007). Another example is the question
whether tuition fees improve the quality of higher education (e.g., Kemnitz, 2005;
Huebner, 2009). In these models the assumptions concerning mobility of univer-
sity applicants crucially determine the results. Our analysis goes one step behind
and investigates whether the mobility behavior of university applicants is actually
aﬀected by policy changes.
Empirical studies on the eﬀect of tuition fees on student mobility are so far
mainly based on data from the United States. In the US tuition fees vary widely
across states and between universities. Further, all public universities charge out-of-
state students with higher tuition fees (non-resident fee) than in-state students. The
argument for this is that states are not willing to subsidize the university education
of children of non-residents.
Empirical results on the sign of the eﬀect of tuition fees on enrolment are am-
biguous: On the one hand, high fees may represent important academic heritage and
prestige, oﬀering greater potential future earnings to its graduates.1 On the other
1For instance, Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2003) ﬁnd that an institution’s quality inﬂuences the
1hand, high tuition raises the cost of attending certain universities (price eﬀect).
Research on student mobility has started with Tuckman (1970), who ﬁnds that
student out-migration rates vary positively with average tuition fees charged to resi-
dents within a particular state. Mixon (1992) updates the data gathered by Tuckman
and ﬁnds that the eﬀect of tuition fees on out-migration remains signiﬁcantly pos-
itive. Also the study by Morgan (1983), who jointly estimates non-resident tuition
rates and the non-resident student’s demand for higher education, concludes that
students who consider to attend out-of-state universities are signiﬁcantly deterred by
tuition fees. By contrast, employing cross-sectional information on student state-to-
state migration ﬂows and controlling for quality and economic conditions, McHugh
and Morgan (1984) ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of non-resident tuition fees on enroll-
ment by non-resident high-school graduates. In a study based on university-level
data Mixon and Hsing (1994) analyze the determinants of the ratio of resident to
non-resident students for a sample of public and private academic institutions. They
estimate a positive eﬀect of non-resident tuition fees on enrollment by out-of-state
high-school graduates. Their results suggest that tuition acts as a “signal” for uni-
versity prestige that prevails over the price eﬀect of non-resident tuition fees. In a
more recent study Dotterweich and Baryla (2005) employ a data set which contains
both information on universities and information on the economic conditions of their
regional environments. Similar to the earlier studies they come up with a positive
relation between non-resident enrollment and tuition in private institutions, while
no signiﬁcant relationship seems to exist in public institutions.
The mixed empirical evidence from the US does not allow to make clear predic-
tions about how the introduction of tuition fees in some but not all federal states
in Germany might aﬀect applicants’ mobility. Moreover, the institutional back-
ground is very diﬀerent in Germany, where tuition fees are much lower and private
universities play only a very minor role.
Table A1 in the appendix shows that German students are relatively immobile.
In 2003 in all German states, except for Brandenburg, the majority of ﬁrst year stu-
dents studied in the federal state where they had obtained their high-school leaving
degree. In Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Saxony, this share was even larger:
In these states, more than 70% of ﬁrst year students studied at a home university.
If individuals decide to take up their studies in another state, they mostly choose
their neighboring state. The share of high-school graduates moving beyond the bor-
dering state is below 5% (cf. Figure A1 in the appendix; an exception are students
in-state and out-of-state tuition level.
2from Saarland). Moreover, there is neither signiﬁcant migration from the western
states of Germany to eastern states nor vice versa. Only a very small number of
students from the eastern states Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt,
and Thuringia move to western states (although even in this case, these shares are
below 10%).
Evidence for the importance of the closeness to home in the choice of the uni-
versity also comes from surveys among students. Heine et al. (2008) report that
75% of all ﬁrst semester students state that the closeness to home is one important
determinant in the choice of university.2 All this evidence shows that - although
there is some mobility, in particular into neighboring states and city states - the
majority of university applicants chooses a university in their home country.
The question that we analyze in our paper is whether there is a mobility reaction
to state-speciﬁc education policy diﬀerences, in particular tuition fees. We exploit
the “natural experiment” character of the introduction of tuition fees, that have not
been introduced in all states but in only 6 out of 16. Based on data on applicants for
medical school by the central clearing house (ZVS) we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
strategy in order to estimate the eﬀect of the introduction of tuition fees on the
probability to study in one’s home state. Our ﬁndings show that in fact, university
applicants from “fee states” have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of applying at a
university in their home state after tuition fees were introduced. The reaction is
stronger for men than for women and for applicants with lower high-school grades.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes
the introduction of tuition fees and the corresponding public discussion in Germany.
After that, we present our methodological approach and data base in more detail in
Section 3. Section 4 shows the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In the end of the 1960s tuition fees for students at state universities were abolished in
all German states. A few years later, fees were legally banned by federal legislation.
From that time on students in Germany only had to pay a small enrollment fee
of less than 100 euro per term for admission to a state university. However, in
2More indirect evidence on the immobility of German high-school graduates is provided in a
study by Spiess and Wrohlich (2009). The authors show that the distance to the nearest university
at the time of the high-school leaving exam signiﬁcantly aﬀects the decision to apply for a university.
3May 2003 six federal states3 with a conservative government ﬁled a constitutional
law suite against the nationwide ban of tuition fees. In January 2005 the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany ruled that the law against tuition fees interfered
with the rights of the German federal states to determine their education policies.
Thus, federal states can decide on the implementation of tuition fees in their federal
territory autonomously.
At the time the judgment about tuition fees was made the conservative fed-
eral governments of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, and
Saarland announced to implement tuition fees.4 In federal states with a governing
coalition of the conservative (CDU) and social democratic party (SPD), the SPD
strongly rejected tuition fees. For that reason the implementation of fees in these
states (Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony) was not to be expected. Hence, after the ruling
of the court in January 2005 high-school graduates could anticipate that Bavaria,
Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, and Saarland would pass legislations
to implement tuition fees, while the situation in Hesse was unclear. Until May 2005
the social democratic government in North Rhine-Westphalia still strongly rejected
fees, but a government change in May 2005 changed the situation and the new
conservative government announced to introduce tuition fees as soon as possible.
Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia were the ﬁrst to charge tuition fees
in the fall term of 2006. Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Hamburg followed in
the spring term of 2007. Saarland completed the process of implementing tuition
fees in the fall term of 2007. Hesse also imposed fees in the fall term of 2007, but
the fees were again disestablished in the next year. So far the other states5 have
neither started any legal action to introduce fees in their states nor could tuition
fees be expected from the public debate in these states.
Despite the fact that states have the undivided power to decide on tuition fees,
fees have been rather uniform across the states that introduced fees. Most students
have to pay a fee of 500 euro per term, leading to an investment of 1000 euro per
academic year. In Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia the implementation of tu-
ition fees is decentralized, meaning that universities decide on the fees autonomously.
3Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hamburg, Saarland, Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt.
4Thuringia was also governed by the conservative party in 2005. Still, Thuringia’s prime minister
declared not to raise tuition fees for university students. Hesse’s conservative government was in
favor of tuition fees, but inferences with the federal constitution constrained the political decision-
making on tuition-fees.
5Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen, Bran-
denburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia.
4Still, most universities in these states charge 500 euro.6
The legal and political discussion about tuition fees was highly visible in the
media. Nationwide newspapers and magazines as “UniSpiegel” and the “Frankfurter
SonntagsZeitung” (FAS), among others, continuously published dossiers on the po-
litical debate on tuition fees and actively released estimates on where and when fees
were going to be imposed. Shortly before the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the
“FAS” published an overview of the federal plans suggesting that Bavaria, Baden-
Württemberg, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland, and
Saxony-Anhalt would be raising tuition fees, while Hesse’s plans were described as
ambiguous. The same situation was predicted in March of the same year by the
magazine “StudiInfo”, that is distributed by the central clearing house.7 A reg-
ularly up-dated dossier in the online edition of “UniSpiegel” has summarized all
actions and decisions made in the process of the implementation. For an overview
of the public debate and the states where tuition fees were actually introduced see
Table 1.
University applicants who applied for university in May-July 2005 were the ﬁrst
cohort to know with certainty that they will have to pay tuition fees for their studies
in some federal states, while studying will continue to be free of charge in other
states. Furthermore, they could distinguish between states charging tuition fees in
the near future and states without plans to impose fees.
3 Estimation Strategy and Data
In order to evaluate the eﬀect of the introduction of tuition fees on the mobility
of university applicants we exploit the variation in the introduction of tuition fees
across states as a “natural experiment”. As usual in the evaluation literature, we
cannot observe the behavior Yi of an individual (in our case, the decision to ap-
ply for a university in one’s home state) under both scenarios, with and without
treatment. However, we argue that we can take treatment, i.e., living in a state
that introduced tuition fees, as exogenous and can therefore compare the average
behavior of individuals living in the two diﬀerent state groups. Let us denote the
behavior of individuals who live in states that introduced tuition fees YijG = 1 and
6Only two universities that have a medical school charge lower fees of 350 euro and 275 euro
(Bielefeld and Münster in North Rhine-Westphalia).
7All high-school graduates who wish to apply for medical school in Germany have to apply at
a central clearing house called “Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen” (ZVS). See next
section.
5Table 1: Public debate on tuition fees
Estimates after the Ruling (26.01.2005) Actual Development
State FAS StudiInfo UniSpiegel Fees since
(Jan 2005) (March 2005) (May 2005)
Baden-Württemberg X X X Spring 2007
Bavaria X X X Spring 2007
Hesse ? X ? Fall 2007-Fall 08
Hamburg X X X Spring 2007
Lower-Saxony X X X Fall 2006
North Rhine-Westph. – – X Fall 2006
Saaarland X X X Fall 2007
Rhineland-Palatinate – – – –
Saxony-Anhalt ? X – –
Berlin – – – –
Brandenburg – – – –
Bremen ? – – –
Mecklenb.-Western P. – – – –
Saxony – – – –
Thuringia – – – –
Schleswig-Holstein – – – –
Sources: Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 23.01.2005, Nr.3; StudiInfo, is-
sue Wintersemester 2005/06, "Wieviel kostet das Bezahlstudium"; UniSpiegel online
(http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/).
Description: (X/?/–) indicates fees expected/unclear/no fees expected.
the behavior of those who live in the other group of states as YijG = 0. The eﬀect
of treatment G on the application behavior could then be calculated by comparing
the average behavior across groups, i.e., (Y jG = 1)   (Y jG = 0). However, if “state
eﬀects” are present that are common to the group of states that introduced tuition
fees, this diﬀerence does not give the causal eﬀect of introducing tuition fees. In
order to control for this potential common state eﬀect, we employ a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence strategy that eliminates all time-invariant diﬀerences. Let us denote the
period before treatment as T = 0 and the period after treatment as T = 1. Then
we can calculate the eﬀect of tuition fees  as
 =
 




(Y jG = 1;T = 0)   (Y jG = 0;T = 0)

: (1)
We argue that all university applicants living in a state that was considered to
introduce tuition fees in the latest newspaper article (“UniSpiegel”) were subject to
treatment after the Constitutional Court’s decision in January 2005. In spring 2005,
it was known that these states would start legal procedures to introduce tuition fees.
Since tuition fees have to be paid over the whole time of studying and not only at the
beginning, we argue that there is a treatment eﬀect already for those who applied
for university in spring 2005. We will later also perform sensitivity checks to see
6whether a treatment eﬀect can be found later, when the states had actually started
to levy tuition fees, which was fall term 2006 in Northrhine-Westphalia and Lower
Saxony and 2007 in the other “tuition states”.
Note that one problem with our identiﬁcation strategy is that up to the extent
that university applicants are mobile, also individuals in the control group might be
aﬀected by the reform. Applying in (non-home) states that introduced tuition fees
likely became less attractive after the reform. As a consequence, the probability of
applying at a university in the home state might have also increased for individuals
in states of the control group due to the reform. If this is the case, our estimation
yields an upper bound of the true eﬀect on the treated individuals. However, we
argue that we get a result close to the true eﬀect by taking advantage of the fact that
there is only very little migration from east German applicants to western states and
vice versa, although there is migration within both group of states (cf. Figure A1 in
the appendix). Since no east German state introduced the fees, we can alternatively
deﬁne the control group consisting only of states in east Germany in order to get a
result that is closer to the true eﬀect. We will refer to this point below.
Our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis of the eﬀect of tuition fees on applicants’
mobility requires a broad data set including all federal states. We have access to a
database of the German central clearing house (ZVS) covering applications for the
years 2002 to 2008. The following six subjects are centrally administered and part of
our data set: medicine, pharmacy, animal health, dentistry, psychology, and biology.
For these subjects, the data set is comprehensive, since all individuals who want to
study one of these subjects necessarily have to apply with the central clearing house.
Applicants between 2002 and 2004 were allowed to apply for two subjects at a time.
In that case we only include the ﬁrst subject choice of the applicant to avoid multiple
counting. Multiple applications have not been possible between 2005 and 2008.
Note that one advantage of these data is that they contain information on true
preferences of applicants, i.e., the universities they want to go, not actually chosen
universities, which might be aﬀected by supply side constraints. To determine the
eﬀect of tuition fees on applicants’ mobility, we deﬁne the variable “home application”
if a person applies to a university which is located in the federal state she passed her
high-school diploma in. This measure is based on applicants’ ﬁrst preference.8 This
seems justiﬁed as the ﬁrst-ranked university is of great importance in the application
8Every applicant may rank up to six universities she applies to. Further, individuals may apply
within three procedures applied sequentially. We only consider the ﬁrst preference in the ﬁrst
procedure (procedure A). If an individual does not apply in procedure A, the ﬁrst preference in
Procedure U is taken.
7because the allocation of seats at university follows a priority-based mechanism.9
In addition to information about university preferences and home state of the
applicants, the data set records individual characteristics such as average grade in
the high-school diploma, age, and sex. For our empirical analysis, we only keep
applicants for medicine and dentistry. Psychology and biology were aﬀected by the
introduction of bachelor studies within the Bologna process and seats for bachelor
students are no longer centrally administered. We further exclude animal health
because animal health can only be studied in four of the German federal states, i.e.,
not all applicants have the chance to study this subject at a home university.
Since applicants who have not received their university entrance diploma in Ger-
many can never be “home applicants”, we exclude these individuals from our data
set. We further exclude applicants from Brandenburg and Bremen because they
cannot apply in their home federal state as there are no medical schools located in
these two states. By far most of the students start studying in fall;10 we therefore
restrict our analysis to applications for the fall term. This leaves us with a total
number of 239,365 individuals over the years 2002 to 2008.
Table 2 shows the distribution of applicants across federal states. The upper
panel of Table 2 shows the number of applicants living in states without tuition fees
while the lower part gives the corresponding information for federal states charging
fees. As we can see from the table, about one-third of the individuals (78,905) live
in a state without tuition fees, while about two-third (160,460) live in a federal
state charging tuition fees. In the group of those living in a state without tuition
fees 44,258 individuals apply for a university within their home state, and another
34,647 apply for a university located outside their home state. In the other group,
107,296 individuals apply within their home state and 53,164 outside their home
state.
As pointed out earlier most individuals apply for a university located in their
home state. This is also what we ﬁnd in the present data set. Over all years and
states, 63% of applicants in our data set rank a university in their home state as
ﬁrst preference. There are only a few states, namely Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate,
9As is extensively discussed in Braun et al. (2007) the ﬁrst preference in the ﬁrst procedure
should not be subject to strategic behavior of the applicants. This is because applicants who are
admitted in the ﬁrst procedure are not allowed to take part in the following two procedures even
though these applicants generally have very good chances of being admitted to their preferred
university in the last procedure (procedure U).
10This is because not all universities oﬀer admission in spring and because high-school graduates
in Germany are awarded their A-levels in May and June shortly before application deadlines for
the fall term in July.
8Table 2: Number of applicants across federal states before/after the introduction of
tuition fees
Homes state ”Home” applicants ”Non-Home” applicants
before after before after Total
(2002-2004) (2005-2008) (2002-2004) (2005-2008)
Berlin 3,796 5,399 648 2,224 12,067
Hesse 3,398 4,760 3,167 5,613 16,938
Mecklenburg-Western Pomeria 1,112 2,003 551 1,166 4,832
Rhineland-Palatinate 1,725 2,227 2,082 3,868 9,902
Saxony 3,619 5,235 1,168 2,902 12,924
Saxony-Anhalt 1,294 2,423 1,055 2,103 6,875
Schleswig-Holstein 1,499 2,155 1,504 2,779 7,937
Thuringia 1,598 2,015 1,265 2,552 7,430
Without tuition fees 18,041 26,217 11,440 23,207 78,905
Baden-Wuerttemberg 11,149 14,086 3,408 8,903 37,546
Bavaria 11,017 14,310 3,053 7,286 35,666
Free and Hanseatic 6,286
City of Hamburg 1,916 2,434 509 1,427 6,286
Lower Saxony 4,695 6,870 3,887 7,601 23,053
North Rhine-Westphalia 16,211 22,700 4,705 11,262 54,878
Saarland 815 1,093 298 825 3,031
With tuition fees 45,803 61,493 15,860 37,304 160,460
Total 63,844 87,710 27,300 60,511 239,365
Source: ZVS data on applicants, waves 2002 to 2008 (fall term).
Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringia, in which more individuals apply to non-home
universities. Interestingly, applicants in federal states charging tuition fees seem to
be particularly immobile; among these federal states, there is none whose students
by majority apply in another federal state. Similar to the overall picture of mobility,
applicants for medical school migrate within eastern and within western Germany
but there is nearly no exchange between these two parts (cf. Figure A2 in the
appendix).
In addition to the total number of applicants, we are also interested in diﬀerences
in personal characteristics of applicants to control for changes in the composition
of applicants over time and to analyze the eﬀect of tuition fees on the behavior of
sub-groups of applicants. Table 3 contrasts the characteristics of those individuals
living in a state without tuition fees and those living in a state with tuition fees.
It further distinguishes the time period before and after the introduction of tuition
fees in some federal states. From Table 3 we can see that there are no important
diﬀerences between the group of controls and the treated. The average applicant is
about 21 years old. Further, average grades for the treatment and the control group
are virtually identical. The average applicant has a grade of 2.3.11
11In Germany grades are measured on a 1 to 6 scale with 1.0 being the top grade. The lowest
passing grade is 4.0. The last column of the table displays the share of applicants in the diﬀerent
9Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Personal characteristics Control group Treatment group
(without tuition fees) (with tuition fees)
before after before after Total share
(2002-2004) (2005-2008) (2002-2004) (2005-2008)
Age (years) 21.113 21.236 21.368 21.406 -
(2.785) (2.883) (2.847) (2.788)
Male 0.370 0.360 0.424 0.403 39.53%
(0.483) (0.480) (0.494) (0.490)
Grade 2.320 2.218 2.394 2.286 -
(0.629)) (0.6250) (0.633) (0.625)
Grade group 1: 1.0 - 1.5 1.229 1.233 1.227 1.221 9.77%
(0.142) (0.142) (0.144) (0.147)
Grade group 2: 1.6 - 2.0 1.718 1.724 1.718 1.727 20.31%
(0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.142)
Grade group 3: 2.1 - 2.5 2.205 2.194 2.209 2.196 28.40%
(0.140) (0.141) (0.138) (0.139)
Grade group 4: 2.5 - 3.0 2.688 2.679 2.691 2.686 24.47%
(0.140) (0.140) (0.141) (0.140)
Grade group 5: 3.0 - 4.0 3.232 3.221 3.247 3.245 17.05%
(0.191) (0.191) (0.203) (0.203)
Total 29,481 49,424 61,663 98,797 239,365
Source: ZVS data on applicants, waves 2002 to 2008 (fall term). Standard deviation in parentheses.
4 Results
To identify the eﬀect of tuition fees on the mobility of applicants who graduated
from high school in a state where fees were implemented, we estimate the probability
that a person applies for a university in his or her home state using probit models.
Let y
i denote a latent variable such as the propensity to apply for a university in
own’s home state (see equation 2). According to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence strategy
explained in Section 3, the explanatory variables include a dummy variable indicat-
ing the period after the introduction of the tuition fees (“after”), a dummy variable
indicating the group of states that introduced fees (“fee state”) as well as an inter-
action term of the two. The coeﬃcient of this interaction term, 3, gives the causal
eﬀect of tuition fees on the probability to apply in one’s home state. Furthermore,
we control for sex, age, grade of the high-school diploma as well as for an overall
time trend, summarized in Xi. The vector of control variables moreover includes
the variable “top university”. This is a dummy variable indicating if an individual
comes from Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg or Berlin. We restrict “top universities” to
these three states, since the medical schools ranked best are located in these states.12
Therefore, applicants from these states might have a higher probability to stay in
grade groups.
12CHE UniversityRanking for medical school, year 2006.
10their home state, since it oﬀers one of the best or most popular medical schools. "i
is an error term following a normal distribution.
y

i = 1  afteri + 2  feestatei + 3  after  feestatei + 
0Xi + "i; (2)
Table 4 summarizes the main estimation results (marginal eﬀects). First of all,
we ﬁnd that applicants from “fee states” have generally a higher probability to apply
for a university at home, as has already been suggested by the descriptive statistics
in Section 3. Second, there seems to be a general time trend in that mobility in all
states is higher in the years after tuition fees have been announced in some states.
The interaction term of the two variables is strongly signiﬁcant and indicates that on
top of that trend, applicants from fee states have a signiﬁcantly lower probability to
apply for a university in their home state.13 This probability is reduced by roughly
3 percentage points (baseline 63%).
This result is robust to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the treatment group. Table 4
also shows estimation results when we change the treatment period from 2005-2008
(basic model) to 2006-2008 (columns 3 and 4) and 2007-2008 (columns 5 and 6),
respectively. We estimate these speciﬁcations to check whether the actual introduc-
tion of the tuition fees has an additional eﬀect on top of the “announcement eﬀect”.
We do not ﬁnd support for this hypothesis, since the interaction term is roughly of
the same magnitude as in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation. Also the eﬀect of the control vari-
ables such as sex and grade of the high-school diploma is constant across the three
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. We ﬁnd that applicants with very good grades (grade cate-
gory 1) have a lower probability to apply in their home state than applicants with
lower grades. As expected, applicants living in a state with at least one top-ranked
medical school have a higher probability to apply at home.
As mentioned earlier, up to the extent that university applicants in the control
group have been mobile and applied in a diﬀerent state (now charging tuition fees)
than their home state before the reform, we are overestimating the true eﬀect on
the treated individuals. However, we argue that, since there is very little east-west
or west-east migration, we can conﬁne our control group to eastern states and get
an estimate that should be close to the true eﬀect. As Figure A2 in the appendix
shows, the migration ﬂows of medical school applicants are not diﬀerent from those
of all ﬁrst year students. Most migration is observed between neighboring states
13Following Ai and Norton (2003) we calculate the marginal eﬀect of the interaction term as
(b feestate+ b after+ b afterfeestate+b 0X) (b feestate+b 0X) (b after+b 0X)+(b 0X) where
 is the cdf of the normal distribution. The corresponding standard errors are calculated using
the Delta method.
11Table 4: Estimation results (marginal eﬀects)
Basic Model Sensitivity check 1 Sensitivity check 2
Treatment period 2005-2008 2006-2008 2007-2008
Variable Marg. Eﬀ. Std. Err. Marg. Eﬀ. Std. Err. Marg. Eﬀ. Std. Err.
Fee State 0.1218*** 0.0037 0.120*** 0.0038 0.1157*** 0.0038
After -0.1528*** 0.0054 -0.165*** 0.0058 -0.1623*** 0.0062
After * Fee State -0.031*** 0.0042 -0.0220*** 0.0045 -0.0273*** 0.0005
Male -0.0074*** 0.0021 -0.0060*** 0.0023 -0.0066*** 0.0025
Age 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0005
Top Universtity 0.0381*** 0.0024 0.0414*** 0.0027 0.0475*** 0.0029
Grade1
1.0-1.5 -0.0108** 0.0042 -0.0114** 0.0046 -0.0182*** 0.0051
1.6-2.0 -0.0019 0.0035 -0.0046 0.0038 -0.0078 0.0042
2.1-2.5 -0.0462*** 0.0032 -0.0462*** 0.0035 -0.0425*** 0.0039
2.5-3.0 -0.0295*** 0.0032 -0.0265*** 0.0035 -0.0244*** 0.0039
Year Dummies
fall 2003 -0.0142*** 0.0043 -0.0142*** 0.0043 -0.0142*** 0.0043
fall 2004 -0.0135*** 0.0042 -0.0134*** 0.0042 -0.0134*** 0.0041
fall 2005 0.0508*** 0.0034 – – – –
fall 2006 0.0238*** 0.0036 0.0217*** 0.0037 – –
fall 2007 0.0058* 0.0036 0.0038 0.0037 0.0043 0.0037
Procedure A2 0.0548*** 0.0039 0.0623*** 0.0044 0.0594*** 0.0046
Number of Observations 239,365 199,459 163,861
Source: Estimations based on ZVS data on applicants, waves 2002 to 2008 (fall term).
(***/**/*/): indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%- / 5%- / 10%-level. Control group in all three speciﬁ-
cations: years 2002 to 2004.
1 Grades in high-school diploma. Declining from 1 to 4. Grade group 5 with grades 3.0 to 4.0 serves
as base category.
2 As noted earlier we only consider the ﬁrst preference of applicants. This ﬁrst preference stems from
procedure A where applicants with excellent grades have a very good chance of being admitted to
their preferred university or from procedure U which allows universities to admit students according
to their own preferences (for details on these procedures cf. Braun et al., 2007). Since there may be
diﬀerences across procedures, we control for the procedure preferences have been stated for.
12and there is very few east-west or west-east migration.
Thus, in Table 5, we show estimation results where the three western states
without tuition fees, i.e., Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein, are
excluded. Indeed, compared to the previous results, the marginal eﬀect of the inter-
action term capturing treatment is smaller in this case, indicating that including the
western states in the control group leads to an upward bias of the true eﬀect. The
interaction term, however, is still strongly signiﬁcant and shows that the introduc-
tion of tuition fees reduces the probability of an applicant from a tuition fee state to
apply at home by 2 percentage points (baseline 69%).14 We argue that this estimate
comes close to the true eﬀect, since there has been relatively little migration from
eastern to western states before the reform.
In the next step, we further exploit information on individual characteristics
available in our data set and check for heterogenous eﬀects for applicants with
diﬀerent grades. We estimate a model in which we additionally interact the in-
teraction term of “fee-state” and “after” with dummy variables indicating diﬀerent
grade groups. As can be seen from the results summarized in Table 6, we ﬁnd that
applicants with very good grades (average grades 1.0 - 1.5) have an even higher
probability of applying in their home state than they would have had in a scenario
without tuition fees. On the other hand, applicants whose grades are worse have a
higher probability of applying in another state. This implies that applicants with
very good grades are more willing to pay the tuition fee and/or are less willing to
leave their home state, despite the fee. The reason might be that they are more con-
ﬁdent in their ability to complete university and ﬁnd a high-income job. Another
explanation could be that good students believe that the introduction of tuition
fees will increase the quality of universities in tuition states and therefore choose
those universities. Several universities waive students with stipends and with the
best grades in the ﬁrst university exams from fees; since grades in the high-school
diploma are probably correlated with grades in university exams and with the prob-
ability of obtaining a stipend, it is also possible that excellent applicants hope for
being exempted and hence more weakly react to the introduction of fees.
While we can only speculate about the reason for the heterogenous eﬀects, tuition
14Another sensitivity check we performed is an estimation where Sachsen-Anhalt is left out
of the control group, since in the year 2007, the number of high-school graduates doubled due
to a schooling reform. In this case, the point estimate is a bit lower, however not statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one reported above. Moreover, we performed a so-called “placebo-
treatment” exercise where we randomly assigned states from the control group into a placebo
treatment group (see Table A4 in the Appendix). We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of the placebo
reform.
13Table 5: Estimation results with eastern states as control group
(marginal eﬀects)
Variable Marg. Eﬀ. Std. Err.
Fee State 0.0196*** 0.0045
After -0.1756*** 0.0061
After * Fee State -0.0207*** 0.0049
Male -0.0028 0.0022
Age 0.0004 0.0004







fall 2003 0.0221*** 0.0047
fall 2004 0.0223*** 0.0045
fall 2005 0.0456*** 0.0036
fall 2006 0.0242*** 0.0038
fall 2007 0.0072* 0.0038
procedure A2 0.0540*** 0.0041
Number of Observations 204,588
Source: Estimations based on ZVS adiministrative data, waves 2002
to 2008 (fall term).
(*/**/***): indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%- / 5%- / 10%-level.
1 Grades in high-school diploma. Declining from 1 to 4. Grade group 5
with grades 3.0 to 4.0 serves as base category.
2 As noted earlier we only consider the ﬁrst preference of applicants.
This ﬁrst preference stems from procedure A where applicants with
excellent grades have a very good chance of being admitted to their
preferred university or from procedure U which allows universities to
admit students according to their own preferences (for details on these
procedures cf. Braun et al., 2007). Since there may be diﬀerences across
procedures, we control for the procedure preferences have been stated
for.
14Table 6: Estimation results with eastern states as control
group (marginal eﬀects): by grade
Variable Marginal Eﬀect1 Standard Error
Grade1 * After * Fee State 0.0850*** 0.0082
Grade2 * After * Fee State 0.0011 0.0064
Grade3 * After * Fee State -0.0596*** 0.0061
Grade4 * After * Fee State -0.0458*** 0.0063
Grade5 * After * Fee State -0.0093 0.0069
Source: Estimations based on ZVS data on applicants, waves
2002 to 2008 (fall term).
(***/**/*): indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%- / 5%- / 10%-level.
1 Calculation based on the results presented in Table A3 in the
appendix.
fees in some but not all states certainly have consequences for the composition of
students in universities across Germany. If the “high ability” students stay in the
tuition states, universities in states without fees are left with the “less able” students
or, more exactly, are only able to attract “less able” students. This could in turn
amplify the process of implementing “Elite-Universities”. Besides, we ﬁnd that men
are more responsive to the introduction of tuition fees than women are.15
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the small empirical literature on changes in applicants’
mobility if tuition fees are introduced. Knowing the size of applicants’ reaction is
important from both a political and an academic point of view. Politically, it is
of great interest since all German high-school graduates are allowed to nationwide
apply for universities. If the mobility of university applicants is aﬀected in such a
way that universities in tuition fee states are avoided, this may entail higher costs
for those states who did not introduce tuition fees. Since applicants may react
diﬀerently depending on their personal characteristics, tuition fees might also aﬀect
the composition of applicants.
We estimate the size of applicants’ reaction by exploiting a “natural experiment”.
In particular, we take advantage of the fact that recently, several but not all federal
states in Germany introduced tuition fees. Arguing that the treatment, i.e., living
in a state that introduced tuition fees, is exogenous we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
approach to obtain the causal eﬀect of fees on the probability to apply for a university
in one’s home state. In so far as, before the reform, individuals from non-fee states
had applied in states nowadays charging fees and have been deterred from doing
15More detailed results on this ﬁnding can be obtained from the authors upon request.
15so after the reform, we overestimate the true eﬀect. However, we argue that we
get a result close to the true eﬀect by taking advantage of the fact that there is
only very little migration from east German applicants to western states and vice
versa. We thus deﬁne the control group consisting only of states in east Germany
in order to get a result that is close to the true eﬀect. We ﬁnd that applicants from
fee states have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of applying for a university in their
home state once tuition fees have been introduced. The probability of applying at
home is reduced by roughly 2 percentage points (baseline probability 69%).
As our results show, this average eﬀect in fact hides important diﬀerences be-
tween individuals. For example, we ﬁnd that applicants with lower high-school
grades react more strongly to the introduction of fees and are more likely to apply
in a non-home state. In contrast, applicants with excellent high-school grades even
have a higher probability to stay in their home state after tuition fees have been
introduced. These heterogenous behavioral eﬀects lead to diﬀerences in the compo-
sition of students across states. In particular, this implies that the advantage of “fee
states” is twofold. First, they increase their budget by collecting fees, and second,
they attract applicants with better grades.
Against this background, the political discussion on centralized versus de-central-
ized ﬁnance of higher education is likely to continue. It might be that other federal
states will follow and introduce general tuition fees. Another possibility is that the
idea of non-fee states to introduce fees for non-resident applicants (so-called “Landes-
kinderregelung”) might regain importance. Such a regulation has shortly been in
place in Hamburg. The criteria, however, whether fees had to be paid were not con-
ditioned on the state of the high-school exam but rather the residential state of the
applicant (“Hauptwohnsitz”). By moving to Hamburg, thus, every applicant could
avoid the fees. In the United States, all public research institutions charge out-of-
state students higher tuition fees than in-state students, presumably because state
taxpayers do not want to subsidize higher education of non-taxpayers from other
states. Several states in the US have combined this price discrimination between
in-state and out-of-state residents with reciprocity agreements between neighboring
states that allow non-resident students from a neighboring state to attend the pub-
lic institution at less than the normal out-of-state (see Rizzo and Ehrenberg, 2003).
In the German context, such agreements might be interesting for small states who
cannot aﬀord to oﬀer university education in all subjects and might also encour-
age universities to achieve cost eﬃciencies by specialization. Another possibility to
compensate non-fee states for additional non-resident students’ enrollment might be
16a reform of the ﬁnancial equalization scheme that takes university education into
account.
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196 Appendix
Figure A1: Mobility of First Year Students (2003)
Source: Own depiction. Figure based on Table A1.
20Figure A2: Mobility of Applicants for Medical Schools (2003)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table A3: Estimation results with eastern states as con-
trol group: by grade
Variable Marginal Eﬀect Standard Error
Grade1 * After * Fee State 0.2513*** 0.0234
Grade2 * After * Fee State 0.0279 0.0192
Grade4 * After * Fee State -0.1253*** 0.0179
Grade5 * After * Fee State -0.0923*** 0.0185
Fee State 0.0477*** 0.0122
After -0.4981*** 0.0183
After * Fee State -0.0363 0.0197
Male -0.0074 0.0060
Age 0.0014 0.0011







fall 2003 -0.0616*** 0.0126
fall 2004 -0.0631*** 0.0121
fall 2005 0.1335*** 0.0103
fall 2006 0.0711*** 0.0107
fall 2007 0.0225** 0.0106
procedure A2 0.1435*** 0.0113
Constant 0.6310*** 0.0291
Number of Observations 204,588
Source: Estimations based on ZVS data on applicants, waves
2002 to 2008 (fall term).
(***/**/*): indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%- / 5%- / 10%-level.
1 Grades in high-school diploma. Declining from 1 to 4.
2 As noted earlier we only consider the ﬁrst preference of ap-
plicants. This ﬁrst preference stems from procedure A where
applicants with excellent grades have a very good chance of be-
ing admitted to their preferred university or from procedure U
which allows universities to admit students according to their
own preferences (for details on these procedures cf. Braun et
al., 2007). Since there may be diﬀerences across procedures, we
control for the procedure preferences have been stated for.
24Table A4: Estimation results: Placebo treatment
(Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony as
treatment group; Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia as
control group)
Variable Marg. Eﬀ.Std. Err.
Placebo Fee State 0.1851*** 0.0092
After -0.1284*** 0.0146









fall 2003 0.0103 0.0121
fall 2004 0.0105 0.0116
fall 2005 0.0691*** 0.0095
fall 2006 0.0153*** 0.0101
fall 2007 0.0102 0.0100
procedure A2 0.0568 0.0111
Number of Observations 32,061
Source: Estimations based on ZVS data on applicants,
waves 2002-2008 (fall term) .
(*/**/***): indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%- / 5%- /
10%-level.
1 Grades in high-school diploma. Declining from 1 to 4.
2 As noted earlier we only consider the ﬁrst preference of
applicants. This ﬁrst preference stems from procedure A
where applicants with excellent grades have a very good
chance of being admitted to their preferred university or
from procedure U which allows universities to admit stu-
dents according to their own preferences (for details on
these procedures cf. Braun et al., 2007). Since there may
be diﬀerences across procedures, we control for the pro-
cedure preferences have been stated for.
25